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ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE IN THE BUREAU
OF LAND MANAGEMENT
By Robert W. Swensont
Sweeping demands for reform in the procedure of federal agencies
have characterized recent developments in administrative law. In
1955 it was the Hoover Commission and Task Force Reports on Legal
Services and Procedures." This was followed by intensive activity in
the American Bar Association, culminating in its proposed Admin-
istrative Practice Act, administrative code and other bills now before
Congress.2 If these measures become law, federal administrative law
will undergo considerable change. The pressure for general reform
has tended to obscure the fact that a number of agencies are con-
stantly reviewing their procedural rules in an effort to comply more
fully with the letter and spirit of the Administrative Procedure Act
of 1946.3 This may represent a belated recognition of the fact that
the APA is, from their point of view, the lesser of two evils. Or, it
may represent an honest effort to meet the criticism which various
studies have pointed up. At any rate, reform is in the air. No attempt
will be made here to evaluate the new proposals. The purpose of this
comment is to direct attention to one agency which has revamped its
procedure since 1946 with considerable success: the Bureau of Land
Management of the Department of Interior. The discussion of Bureau
procedure will be limited to mining claims and grazing applications.
The Department of the Interior, established in 1849, has tradition-
ally been the repository of a number of unrelated responsibilities.
One of its principal functions is the supervision of the exploitation of
most of our natural resources on the vast federally-owned "public
domain" which comprises a large part of each of the states in the
West and Alaska. One of its most active divisions is the Bureau of
Land Management, established in 1946 pursuant to Reorganization
Plan No. 3 as a result of the consolidation of the General Land Office
t Professor of Law, University of Utah.
1. [Hoover] Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Gov-
ernment, Report to Congress on Legal Services and Procedures (1955) and Task
Force Report (1955). See generally, Symposium: Hoover Commission and Task
Force Reports on Legal Services and Procedure, 30 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1267-1417
(1955).
2. See Schwartz, Annual Survey of American Law, 1957: Administrative Law,
33 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 154-55 (1958).
3. 60 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. §§ 1001-11 (1952).
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and the Grazing Service.4 Its function is to manage approximately
468 million acres of public domain land. Under its supervision are
the revested Oregon and California railroad land and other unre-
served land. It has control over vast forest land, dividing responsi-
bility in this area with the Forest Service of the Department of Agri-
culture which has had jurisdiction over the national forest since 1905.
It manages range land under the Taylor Grazing Act of 1934. In
addition, it handles homestead and mineral entries of various kinds,
supervises the surveying and sale of federal lands, and maintains
patent records. The magnitude of its operations is described annually
in the report of the Secretary of the Interior.
THE TAYLOR GRAZING ACT
Since the turn of the century, it became increasingly apparent that
federal range land in the West was in serious danger of depletion due
to overgrazing and other wasteful practices. The free use of grazing
land in the public domain was said to be based upon an implied license
from the government.5 Uncontrolled use of range land ended with
the enactment in 1934 of the Taylor Grazing Act.6 Although it was
intended primarily as a conservation measure,7 the act recites that
one of its purposes is to stabilize the livestock industry. The Secre-
tary of the Interior was authorized to make temporary withdrawalss
of unreserved and unappropriated land" chiefly valuable for grazing
and raising forage crops. He was authorized to establish grazing
districts and to issue grazing permits for periods not exceeding ten
years, with preferential rights of renewal. In issuing permits, local
administrators have the benefit of recommendations from advisory
boards made up of local grazers and conservationists. Preference is
given to ranchers who own land in the vicinity of the grazing district.
Although the statute does not specifically authorize the issuance of
temporary or interim licenses, the department soon discovered that
it could not issue term permits until it had an opportunity to collect
4. For a brief description of the history leading to the organization of the
Bureau of Land Management, see [Hoover] Commission on Organization of the
Executive Branch of the Government, Task Force Report on Real Property Man-
agement 113-15, 117-18 (1955).
5. See Buford v. Houtz, 133 U.S. 320, 326 (1890).
6. 48 Stat. 1269 (1934), as amended, 43 U.S.C. §§ 315-315r (Supp. 1957).
7. See Hatahley v. United States, 351 U.S. 173, 177 (1956); Note, 60 Yale
L.J. 455, 469 (1951).
8. Occasionally the erroneous impression is given that the withdrawals are
permanent. The statute, however, recites that grazing districts may be established
"in order to promote the highest use of the public land pending its final dis-
posal.... ." 48 Stat. 1269 (1934), as amended, 43 U.S.C. § 315 (Supp. 1957).
9. See Young v. Felornia, 121 Utah 646, 651-52, 244 P.2d 862, 865, cert. denied,
344 U.S. 886 (1952).
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the necessary data which would enable it to make permanent plans
for administering the federal range. The issuance of interim licenses
as well as term permits became common."" These are still being
issued.,' The Grazing Service inherited the responsibility of manage-
ment of the federal range, and in 1946, its functions were transferred
to the Bureau of Land Management. 2 At the present time, sixty
grazing districts have been organized, and the Bureau manages ap-
proximately 170 million acres of federal range land.1
3
The legal status of the grazing license or permit is treated below
in some detail because this is an important factor in determining the
nature of the administrative procedure. This will be followed by a
brief review of the procedure before the Bureau in connection with
applications for licenses and permits. Recent developments in the
application of the APA to this procedure will then be discussed.
Legal status of permits and licenses:
The nature of grazing permits and licenses under the Taylor Graz-
ing Act has come before the lower federal courts on several occasions.
The leading case of Red Canyon Sheep Co. v. Ickes-4 involved a suit
to enjoin the Secretary of the Interior and the Commissioner of the
General Land Office from consummating a private exchange of federal
land in a grazing district for privately owned land in a national forest.
The claimed statutory authorization for the exchange was a series
of special statutes enacted between 1929 and 1935 rather than the
general provisions of the Taylor Act. It was held that an injunction
should issue. The proposed exchange was illegal because the various
conditions required by the statutes could not be met. The plaintiff
had been issued, under the Taylor Act, interim grazing permits in
the federal land sought to be exchanged for the private land. He
claimed that if the proposed exchange were consummated, these lands
would no longer be available for grazing purposes. In determining
whether the plaintiff possessed such an interest in the grazing land
as would justify the court in exercising jurisdiction to grant an in-
junction, the court was faced with the provision in section 3 of the
Taylor Act that although grazing privileges "shall be adequately safe-
guarded," the creation of a grazing district or the issuance of a
permit "shall not create any right, title, interest, or estate in or to
the land."' The defendants contended that this section reaffirmed
10. See Brooks v. Dewar, 313 U.S. 354, 360-61 (1941).
11. See E. L. Cord, 64 I.D. 232, 238 (1957).
12. See note 4 supra.
13. U.S. Dept. of the Int. Ann. Rep. xxvii (1957). For an excellent evaluation
of the program of the Bureau see Note, 60 Yale L.J. 455 (1951).
14. 98 F.2d 308 (D.C. Cir. 1938).
15. 48 Stat. 1270 (1934), as amended, 43 U.S.C. § 315b (Supp. 1957).
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decisions prior to the Taylor Act which held that customary grazing
on federal lands created no vested rights.'" The court, however, felt
that, for the purpose of this decision, an interim licensee possessed
something more substantial than a revocable license:
But we do conclude that if the Secretary determines to set up a
grazing district including lands upon which grazing has been
going on, then those who have been grazing their livestock upon
these lands and who bring themselves within a preferred class
set up by the statute and regulations, are entitled as of right to
permits as against others who do not possess the same facilities
for economic and beneficial use of the range.... [W] e are of the
view that the interim licenses which have been temporarily issued
to them must, under the Act, ripen into permits, provided that
Grazing District No. 4, which has been set up so as to include
the lands upon which the appellants have been running their
sheep, continues to exist and to include such lands.17 (Emphasis
added.)
Subsequent decisions have generally taken a more restrictive view
of the nature of interim licenses and grazing permits. These decisions
have involved primarily the question of compensation in eminent
domain proceedings and the liability of agents of the government
under the Federal Tort Claims Act. 8 In an early case, a term grazing
permit issued by the Secretary of Agriculture for forest lands under
his jurisdiction was held to be revocable at any time, and since it is
neither a "contract" with the government nor a "property" interest,
the owner of the permit is not entitled to compensation for its claimed
value in condemnation proceedings involving privately-owned land of
the permittee.19 The compensation problem has been encountered
more recently where private ranch lands have been condemned by the
United States for war purposes. The ranchers usually also owned
Taylor grazing permits on adjacent federal land, and it was freely
acknowledged that these permits substantially contributed to the
value of the private land. In determining the measure of compensa-
tion for taking the private land, the courts held that it was proper
to consider the "highest and most profitable use" of the fee land,
and the fact that it was accessible to permit land was an "appurtenant
element of value." 20 The courts, however, refused to allow the permits
to be separately valued because they could not be classified as property
16. See note 5 supra.
17. 98 F.2d at 314. In Garcia v. Sumrall, 58 Ariz. 526, 121 P.2d 640 (1942),
it was held that a permittee whose permit expired was a tenant at will as far
as other grazers were concerned, although not as against the government.
18. 60 Stat. 842 (1946), as amended, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-80 (1952).
19. Osborne v. United States, 145 F.2d 892 (9th Cir. 1944). In this case the
permits were first withdrawn by the Secretary of the Interior. Condemnation
nroceedings were then instituted.
20. United States v. Jaramillo, 190 F.2d 300, 302 (10th Cir. 1951).
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interests in view of their revocable nature.2 1 Where only the grazing
land is appropriated, the cancelled permits were thus not compensable
under the due process clause. This obvious hardship to permit holders
resulted in an amendment to the Taylor Grazing Act requiring the
agency appropriating the land for war purposes to pay such compen-
sation out of funds available for its project in an amount deemed by
it to be "fair and reasonable."2 The award by the agency is not likely
to be as high as in condemnation proceedings.
The permittee has met with only slightly more success in suits
under the Federal Tort Claims Act. In Chournos v. United States, 23
the plaintiff, owner of base lands, claimed that he was entitled as a
matter of law under the Taylor Grazing Act to permits on adjacent
public land and to crossing permits to move his sheep from one range
to another. He alleged that the government officials refused to issue
such permits in order to coerce him into surrendering control of his
land to the district. It was held that the refusal to issue the permits
21. Id. In this case, the condemnation proceedings did not include the govern-
ment lands and the permits were not revoked. Hence the existing permits could
be regarded as "appurtenant elements" of value to the holder.
A more difficult question was presented in United v. Cox, 190 F.2d 293 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 867 (1951). Over 427,000 acres of land were appro-
priated for war purposes under the Second War Powers Act. 56 Stat. 177, 50
U.S.C. § 171a (1952). These ranch lands consisted of fee land, land leased from
the state, and public domain land on which the ranchers held grazing permits.
Although the grazing permits had not been formally cancelled, the court felt that
there was a "cancellation of the permits by a declaration of taking in the con-
demnation proceedings." It was held to be immaterial that there was no formal
cancellation of the permits but simply a declaration by the government that its
land was to be included in the project. United States v. Osborne, note 19 supra,
was thought to be controlling, and the existence of the permits could not be con-
sidered in determining the value of the fee land. The court drew an analogy to
cases dealing with condemnations under the government's power over navigable
streams, stating that "preferential privileges" incident to riparian ownership
are not compensable. United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229
U.S. 53 (1913) was relied upon. A more recent decision strengthening the courts
analogy is United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222 (1956).
Phillips, J., dissenting in the Cox case, regarded the case in this light: "[T]he
postulate upon which the majority rests its conclusion ... is that since the public
lands were to be embraced within the project, they would not in the future be
available for use in connection with the privately-owned lands under grazing
permits and, hence, they should not be considered in arriving at the value of the
privately-owned lands." He felt that the error in the approach of the majority
is that it represents a retreat from the generally acknowledged rule that value
is fixed at the date of taking. 190 F.2d at 298.
22. 48 Stat. 1270 (1934), as amended, 43 U.S.C. § 315q (Supp. 1957). Under
this statute the agency may either compensate for the cancellation of the permit
or lease back to the government's own permit. McDonald v. McDonald, 61 N.M.
458, 302 P.2d 726 (1956).
23. 193 F.2d 321 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 977 (1952).
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was within the exception from liability under the provisions of the
Federal Tort Claims Act24 relating to the exercise by an agency of its
discretionary functions.25 On the other hand, in Oman v. United
States,26 it was alleged that the government officials interfered with
the plaintiff's exclusive permit by authorizing others to use the land
allotted to the plaintiff and in refusing to cancel the permit of the
plaintiff's transferor. This was held to be actionable under the Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act because the officials had no discretion to permit
such interference and, under the Taylor Act, had no discretion in
refusing to cancel the permit which had been issued to the plaintiff's
transferor.27
The review provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act were
involved in one case.28 The Secretary of the Interior approved a
special rule that both land and water in designated proportions were
to be recognized as base property under the Taylor Act. The applica-
tion of this formula to a request for a grazing permit constituted a
matter committed to th agency's discretion. The decision of the
agency was not, therefore, reviewable under section 10 of the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act.
Procedure for issuance of licenses or permits:
The Department has adopted detailed rules governing the procedure
for the issuance of various types of licenses or permits, hearings on
applications, and appeals. 29 An applicant for a grazing license or
permit must file his application prior to a designated date set by the
range manager of the particular district. The application is con-
sidered first by the district advisory board which makes a recom-
mendation to the range manager. If the recommendation is adverse
to the applicant, the reasons therefor are required to be stated in a
notice to the applicant, and a date is set for filing protests against the
recommendation. At the time and place fixed for the protest meeting,
"any licensee, permittee or applicant" may make either an oral or
written protest. The advisory board reconsiders its recommendation
and makes a final recommendation to the range manager. If this is
adverse to the applicant, the range manager, if he approves, notifies
the applicant, stating the reasons for the decision. This becomes the
manager's final decision for appeal purposes. The range manager is
24. 60 Stat. 842 (1946), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1952).
25. See also Powell v. United States, 233 F.2d 851 (10th Cir. 1956).
26. 179 F.2d 738 (10th Cir. 1949).
27. The court felt that its decision came within the the holding of Red Canyon
Sheep Co. v. Ickes, 98 F.2d 308 (D.C. Cir. 1938).
28. Sellas v. Kirk, 200 F.2d 217 (9th Cir. 1953).
29. 43 C.F.R. §§ 161.9-.10 (Supp. 1957).
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not bound by a favorable recommendation of the advisory board and
may issue or refuse to issue a license or permit if he feels the facts or
circumstances justify such a decision. The applicant is notified of
any variation from a favorable recommendation of the board and
advised of his right to appeal to a hearing examiner. Cancellations
or reductions of licenses or permits need not go through the advisory
board. The procedure is to give the applicant an opportunity to show
cause and to appeal to an examiner from an adverse ruling by the
range manager.
An appeal, including supporting reasons, may be filed in the range
manager's office within 30 days after a decision adverse to the appli-
cant. The manager forwards the appeal to the state supervisor who
thereafter represents the Bureau in any further proceedings in con-
nection with the appeal. A motion to dismiss and an answer may be
filed. All papers are transmitted to the hearing examiner who makes
a ruling on any such motion. If the motion to dismiss is overruled, a
date is set for the hearing by the examiner. Other persons who may
be directly affected by the decision in the opinion of the range man-
ager may also be notified of the hearing, and they are permitted to
appeal as intervenors.
In general the provisions relating to the conduct of the hearing
simulate the typical judicial trial proceeding. Thus, there are provi-
sions for issuing subpoenas, taking depositions, administering oaths,
calling and questioning witnesses, granting continuances. The parties
are required to stipulate so far as possible the material facts and
issues involved. The state supervisor or his representative presents
his case, followed by a similar presentation of the appellant. At the
conclusion of the testimony, an opportunity is given to present pro-
posed findings of fact and conclusions of law. The examiner is re-
quired to hand down a written decision. In any case, the director of
the Bureau may require the examiner to make only a recommended
decision; the initial decision is then made by the director himself. 30
30. Zelph S. Calder, 59 I.D. 528 (1947) involved appeal procedure under the
old regulations. The opinion held that under existing procedure it was error for
the director of the Grazing Service to sign the decision of the hearing examiner
to whom an appeal had been taken. The function of the examiner was either to
render a decision on the findings made by him or to submit a proposed decision
to the Secretary for approval in which case it would become a decision of the
Department. The director of the Grazing Service was outside the hierarchy of
the appellate process. The opinion referred to the fact that subsequently the
regulations had been revised so as to permit the Director of the Bureau of Land
Management to require, in the specific cases, that the examiner make only a
recommended decision, which was to be submitted together with the record to the
director for consideration. The requirement of a recommended decision by the
examiner (the one who hears and presides) was said to be patterned after the
mandate in § 8 (a) of the APA. Under the current regulations apparently the
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Appeals from the decision of the examiner to the director and from
the director to the Secretary of the Interior are provided for. These
are in the main the general rules applicable to all types of proceedings
before the Bureau.3 1 The effect of an appeal from the examiner is to
suspend his decision until determination on appeal. It may, however,
be provided at any stage of the appeal that the initial decision shall
remain in full force and effect until reversed. The rules expressly
provide that the decision becomes reviewable by the courts under
section 10 of the APA only if such provision for immediate effective-
ness is made. Otherwise, the administrative remedies must first be
exhausted.
Effect of the Administrative Procedure Act:
Since the passage of the APA in 1946, the Bureau has endeavored
to make its procedure in grazing applications conform in a general
way to the requirements of the Act. 32 The decision that the APA
governs grazing hearings was based on section 9 of the Taylor Grazing
Act which provides that the Secretary of the Interior "shall provide
by appropriate rules and regulations for local hearings on appeals
from the decisions of the administrative officer in charge... .",33 This
was construed by the Department as requiring a hearing on appeal
in applications for permits or licenses. Section 5 of the APA, which
prescribes basic standards to be observed in hearings, applies to
"adjudication required by statute to be determined on the record after
opportunity for an agency hearing... . ,,3 This interpretation of the
Taylor Act was entirely sound. It led to a revamping of the regula-
tions so as to adopt some of the more desirable features of the APA.
Thus, the requirement of a recommended decision by the hearing
examiner where the director makes the initial decision was patterned
after section 8 (a) of the APA.32 In one departmental decision it was
noted that the regulations were more restrictive than would be re-
quired by the APA.36 As might be expected the departmental rules
examiner may not on his own volition submit a proposed decision to the director
of the Bureau.
31. 43 C.F.R. §§ 221.1.37 (Supp. 1957).
32. See Davis, Government Legal Services, Procedures, and Representation:
A Discussion of the Hoover Report and the Administration of the Department
of the Interior, 50 Nw. U.L. Rev. 726, 729 (1956).
33. 48 Stat. 1273 (1934), as amended, 43 U.S.C. § 315h (Supp. 1957).
34. 60 Stat. 239 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1004 (1952).
35. See note 30 supra.
36. In Frank Halls, 62 I.D. 344 (1955), it was held that decisions cancelling
licenses or permits could not under departmental rules be made effective pending
disposition on appeal. It was noted that § 9 (b) of the APA was less restrictive
since it authorized immediate revocation of licenses in cases of willfulness or
where the public health, interest or safety requires such action.
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were immediately revised.3 7 In another decision, M. F. Sullivan,31
it was suggested that the failure of the range manager to state in
the notice of adverse action on an application, all the reasons upon
which the action was based may violate section 5(a) of the APA.3 9
The opinion reasoned that the very purpose of such a requirement is
to give the parties an opportunity to present evidence on the relevant
issues affecting their rights. Therefore, disregard of the range regu-
lations and section 5 (a) of the APA could not be condoned. The
Sullivan decision was reexamined and its scope restricted in the E. L.
Cord opinion, discussed below.4°
On the question of the right to a hearing on the record, the Depart-
ment, despite its rather liberal attitude toward the APA, drew a
distinction between applications for licenses or permits and protests.
Under the general practice regulations, protests include "any objec-
tion raised by any person to any action proposed to be taken in any
proceeding before the Bureau. .. ." and such action thereon will be
taken as is deemed to be "appropriate in the circumstances." 41 The
regulations contain no requirement of a hearing on the record in
protest cases. A protestant apparently has standing to appeal from
a denial of grazing privileges, however, to the director and to the
Secretary.42 On the other hand, an applicant for a grazing permit or
license is entitled to appeal to the examiner from an adverse decision
and to a hearing on his appeal. This applies also to cancellations of
licenses and permits. The distinction between the two types of
cases is illustrated by the departmental decision in Steele v. Kirby.43
In that case, Mrs. Kirby filed an application to exchange private
land for lands located in a grazing district.44 Protests were filed
by five grazers in the district who had permits which would be
affected by the proposed exchange. Private exchanges are covered
by section 8(b) of the Taylor Act and may be consummated by
37. 43 C.F.R. § 161.10(i) (Supp. 1957).
38. 63 I.D. 269, 276 (1956).
39. Section 5(a) provides: "Persons entitled to notice of an agency hearing
shall be timely informed of... the matters of fact and law asserted. In instances
in which private persons are the moving parties, other parties to the proceeding
shall give prompt notice of issues controverted in fact or law .... " 60 Stat. 239
(1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1004 (1952).
40. See note 48 infra.
41. 43 C.F.R. § 221.52 (Supp. 1957). Under 43 C.F.R. § 160.7 (1954) a protest
is required to contain a complete disclosure of all facts upon which it is based.
If the protestant desires to lease the land embraced in the application for a
permit, the protest should be accompanied by an application for a grazing lease.
43 C.F.R. § 146.8 (b) (1954) deals with protests against private exchanges.
42. See, e.g., Steele v. Kirby, 60 I.D. 389 (1950).
43. Ibid.
44. Rules relating to private exchanges are in 43 C.F.R. §§ 146.1-.8 (1954).
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complying with the conditions laid down by the statute, even though
the selected lands are already covered by licenses or permits. The
protestants claimed that they were entitled to a formal hearing in
order to submit evidence against the proposed exchange. The con-
tention was rejected on the ground that since private exchanges are
committed to the discretion of the Secretary (or his designee), no
hearing is required by the Taylor Act and, hence, the APA has no
application. Moreover, a hearing is not required as a matter of due
process since a license or a permit is not a "vested interest." The
decision relies upon the court decisions relating to the nature of
grazing permits and licenses.4 5 Although the opinion does not so
indicate, the ruling appears to be based upon the privilege-right anal-
ysis which has been utilized by the Supreme Court in other areas.
Thus, government employment is sometimes categorized as a privilege
rather than a right, and hence may be granted or denied summarily
without violating due process. The fallacy in this analysis has often
been pointed out: there is no reason why even a privilege should be
dealt with unfairly. 6 It may be that a permittee does not have a
"vested interest" in the usual sense, but the fact remains that his
permit is a matter of considerable value.4 7 He should not be deprived
of it at least without an opportunity to present evidence showing the
undesirability of the exchange. This is not to say, perhaps, that all
protests should be accorded a full hearing on the record, but the regu-
lations should be amended to accord a hearing to protestants whose
permits will be affected by an exchange. It is difficult to see why a
hearing is not as important here as where the permit is directly
cancelled.
Apart from the position of the Department in connection with pro-
tests, the attitude toward the APA seemed to be one of considerable
liberality until the recent decision in E. L. Cord.48 This case involved
an appeal by a holder of an interim license from a denial of grazing
piivileges. It was contended that the notices of the range manager
violated section 5 (a) of the APA49 in that they failed timely to inform
the licensee of the facts and law asserted so that he could prepare his
defense. In rejecting this contention, it was suggested that it was
based upon a misunderstanding of Bureau procedure. Neither the
Taylor Act nor the regulations provide for any hearing as a condition
precedent to denying or granting a license or a permit. The only
45. See text supported by notes 14-27 supra.
46. Schwartz, A Decade of Administrative Law, 51 Mich. L. Rev. 775, 807-12
(1953); Davis, Administrative Law 246-54 (1951).
47. See Osborne v. United States, 145 F.2d 892, 895 (9th Cir. 1944).
48. 64 I.D. 232 (1957).
49. See note 39 supra.
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hearing provided for in the Taylor Act is on appeal from the decision
of the range manager c The notices of the manager were not notices
of hearings at all but were simply notices of adjudications made by
the range manager which would have become final but for this
licensee's protest. This made compliance with section 5 (a) unneces-
sary. This analysis seems to overlook the departmental rules which
themselves require such notices to state the reasons for the action.-"
Moreover, while it is true that Bureau procedure is perhaps sui generis
in the field of administrative law, the notices required of the range
manager were certainly intended to perform a dual function. On the
one hand, they are designed to inform the licensee of the manager's
final action. But, unless they serve also to set the issues for the appeal
to the hearing examiner, they are meaningless. How can the licensee
possibly formulate any sort of case when he is not aware of the basis
for the decision appealed from? While it is correct that in this
particular case he might have had actual notice, as the opinion sug-
gests, that will not always be the case.
The opinion goes further and states that the licensee cannot com-
plain of the notices because, when he avails himself of the privilege
of appealing, he rather than the Bureau is the moving party and has
the burden of proof. How this demonstrates the fairness of the pro-
cedure is not readily apparent. It rather serves to magnify the
licensee's dilemma. The severity of the decision is ameliorated some-
what by the statement that if the appellant had been the holder of
a term permit, the burden would have been on the Bureau to justify
the reduction.'!
The decision also uses the burden of proof analysis as a basis for
rejecting the objection that the government's case was based entirely
upon hearsay evidence and thus violated section 7 (c) of the APA. It
it doubtful that the applicability of 7 (c) was intended to hinge upon
who has the burden of proof.3*
The burden of proof problem is likely to become one of the most
vexatious problems in Bureau procedure. The Cord decision is by no
means the last word.
MINING CLAIMS
Space permits only the most cursory review of the manner in which
mining claims may be acquired in federal land.5 4 The principal method
50. See note 33 supra.
51. 43 C.F.R. § 161.9(a-4) (Supp. 1957).
52. See M. F. Sullivan, supra note 12.
53. Compare Willapoint Oysters, Inc. v. Ewing, 174 F.2d 676, 690 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 338 U.S. 860 (1949).
54. For a concise summary of current law, see Parriott, Mining Rights in
Public Land, 34 Texas L. Rev. 892 (1956); Note, 4 Utah L. Rev. 239 (1954).
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is by location under the Mining Law of 1872,55 which opened mineral
land in the public domain to free exploitation. Land subject to loca-
tion is limited to vacant, unappropriated and unreserved land in the
public domain. The validity of a mining location depends upon a
"discovery" of valuable minerals. To complete a location, state and
federal statutes combine to require in a general way the posting of
a notice of location, a discovery shaft, the marking off of the bound-
aries of the claim, and the filing of a certificate of location. The size
of the claim depends upon whether it is a lode or placer location. Once
completed, the locator may without payment remove all the minerals
even though he has not patented his claim, and his claim has the usual
characteristics of ownership. A mining claim based on location may
be lost by abandonment or forfeited to a relocator through failure to
perform the required annual assessment work. Federal statutes au-
thorize, but do not require, the locator to obtain a patent.
Mining rights in public land may also be obtained under the Leasing
Act of 1920,56 as amended, which removes from location and places
on a leasing basis certain types of minerals such as coal, oil and gas.
Mining rights in "acquired lands," as distinguished from public
domain land, may be acquired also by leasing.57 Another source of
mining rights is the now comparatively rare Atomic Energy Commis-
sion lease.-"
Bureau procedure in mineral applications:
The Bureau is generally not concerned with the validity of un-
patented mining claims. In a rare case, it may contest the validity
of a mining location,59 but normally contests, adverse proceedings or
protests either are not or cannot be filed until the locator applies for
a government patent. A brief review of these various procedures
follows.6 0
The adverse proceeding is statutory in origin and is available to
obtain a judicial determination of a private controversy between con-
55. Rev. Stat. §§ 2318-52 (1875), as amended, 30 U.S.C. §§ 21-54 (1952).
56. 41 Stat. 437 (1920), as amended, 30 U.S.C. §§ 181-270 (1952).
57. The Acquired Lands Leasing Act, 61 Stat. 913 (1947), as amended, 30
U.S.C. §§ 351-59 (1952), applies to non-metalliferous minerals.
58. Atomic Energy Acts, 60 Stat. 755 (1946), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1801-19 (1952);
68 Stat. 919 (1954), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2281 (Supp. II 1955).
59. 43 C.F.R. § 221-67 (Supp. 1957) provides, "The Government may initiate
contests for any cause affecting the legality or validity of any entry or settlement
or mining claim."
60. For a description of earlier procedures in the General Land Office, see
McClintock, The Administrative Determination of Public Land Controversies,
9 Minn. L. Rev. 542, 546-54 (1925); Attorney General's Committee on Adminis-
trative Procedure, Department of the Interior, Monograph No. 20, 65-73, 87-114
(1940).
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flicting locators where an application for a patent has been filed by
one of them.' It is commenced by filing an adverse claim with the
manager of the local land office where the patent application has been
filed.' This must be done during the 60-day period required for pub-
lishing notice of the patent application. The manager notifies the
patent applicant that the adverse claim has been filed and that the
adverse claimant will be required to commence an action in a compe-
tent court within 30 days from the date of filing. If the claimant fails
to commence suit and to prosecute it with reasonable diligence, he may
not later assert his claim and will be foreclosed by the issuance of
the patent. The suit is generally in the state district court, and the
effect of filing an adverse claim is to stay further patent proceedings.
The adverse proceeding is thus not pursued through administrative
channels. There is a great deal of substantive mining law on what
types of claimants must adverse and the effect of their failure to act.6 3
The private contest is an administrative remedy. It is not a method
by which a conflicting locator may establish his claim. He must
adverse. A private contest may be initiated by one who claims "title
to or an interest in land adverse to any other person" claiming a
similar interest, for the purpose of invalidating the adverse claim
"for any reason not shown by the records" of the Bureau.6 4 A typical
example is the homesteader who claims that his conflicting entry is
valid, as against the mining locator who has applied for a patent, on
the ground that the land is nonmineral. The regulations provide for
the manner in which such conflicts are to be resolved.65 Another illus-
tration is the recent departmental decision, Northern Pac. Ry.66 One
Ralph L. Bassett filed for a noncompetitive oil and gas lease on an
unsurveyed island in the Yellowstone River, Montana. The railroad
first filed a protest and later a "contest," claiming title to the island
under an 1864 railroad grant.6 7 The Department decided that title
never passed to the railroad, and its claim was dismissed. In answer
to the railroad's contention that the rules of practice required a formal
hearing in contests, it was stated that the above regulation applied
only where the adverse title was based upon a claim "not shown by
61. Rev. Stat. § 2326 (1875), as amended, 30 U.S.C. § 30 (1952).
62. 43 C.F.R. §§ 185.78-.83 (1954).
63. See Ricketts, American Mining Law, c. 17, c. 21 (4th ed. 1943); Morrison,
Mining Rights 609-40 (16th ed. 1936).
64. 43 C.F.R. § 221.51 (Supp. 1957).
65. 43 C.F.R. §§ 185.88-.93 (1954).
66. 62 I.D. 401 (1955).
67. The railroad contended that the island was included in the United States
survey of the particular section and therefore passed to it under the grant of
"primary land." For a discussion of railroad land grants, see Swenson, Railroad
Land Grants: A Chapter in Public Land Law, 5 Utah L. Rev. 456 (1957).
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the records" of the Bureau. The railroad's claim here was based upon
documents all of which were in the Bureau's records. The contestant
further claimed that a hearing was required under section 5 of the
APA. The Department dismissed this contention on the ground that
section 5 applied only to hearings required to be held by statute, and
no statutory provision existed for a hearing with respect to a claim
that certain public land had been omitted from an original survey.
Protests against mineral patent applications may also be filed by
anyone who contends that the applicant has failed to comply with the
legal requirements necessary to obtain a patent.68 The protest may
not, however, be made the basis for preserving a claim lost by failure
to adverse. The protestant's case is not based upon his own conflicting
claim, although if he is successful in his protest, he may be in a posi-
tion to assert his claim.69 Normally the protestant has no right to a
hearing,70 and unless he asserts a substantial interest in the land, no
right to appeal from the manager's decision. 71
A protest often results in a government contest of a mining claim.
The government may also on its own motion contest the validity of
a patent application on the ground that the applicant is not entitled
to a patent, e.g., where it is contended that the land is nonmineral or
is not open to location 7 2
Application of the APA to mining claims procedure:
Section 5 of the APA prescribes basic procedural standards to be
observed in connection with formal administrative hearings. Section
5 (c) requires that hearing officers appointed pursuant to the act be
insulated from the investigative and prosecuting functions of the
agency. The requirement of an independent hearing examiner has
been one of the great failures of the APA. The "hearing examiner
68. 43 C.F.R. § 185.86 (1954).
69. Langwith v. Nevada Min. Co., 49 I.D. 629 (1923).
70. 43 C.F.R. § 221.52 (Supp. 1957).
71. Morrison, op. cit. supra note 63, at 642; Ricketts op. cit. supra note 63, at
278. However, 43 C.F.R. § 221.1 (Supp. 1957) may authorize an appeal by any
protestant. If the protestant appears in the role of amicus curiae, it is doubtful
whether he would have standing to appeal as a matter of right. This conclusion
is fortified by the fact that a special provision is made for protests and appeals
by co-owners of mining locations. 43 C.F.R. § 185.86 (1954). The reason for this
special rule is that the Supreme Court held that a co-owner need not adverse a
patent application brought by the other co-owner since the former can establish
in a judicial proceeding his equitable claim against the patentee. Turner v.
Sawyer, 150 U.S. 578 (1893). The decision does not necessarily mean that he
cannot adverse. If he fails to adverse, he can still protest and has standing to
appeal under § 185.86.
72. 43 C.F.R. § 221.67 (Supp. 1957).
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fiasco" has been interestingly detailed elsewhere. 73 Section 5 applies
only to cases of adjudication "required by statute to be determined
on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing." Section 7 (a),
in specifying who may act as hearing examiners in hearings covered
by section 5, contains the proviso that "nothing in this Act shall be
deemed to supersede the conduct of specified classes of proceedings in
whole or in part by or before boards or other officers specifically pro-
vided for by or designated pursuant to statute."
A number of agencies have asserted exemption under these sections
from the provisions of the APA.7 4 Section 5 might seem to be re-
stricted to hearings which are required to be held by statute. The
Supreme Court in Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath75 indicated, however,
that section 5 may apply to a proceeding in which a hearing is re-
quired under the due process clause. The principal problem has been
to determine what officers are "specifically provided for by or desig-
nated pursuant to statute" under section 7(a). At the time of the
adoption of the APA, the Attorney General felt that section 7 (a) was
not intended to provide a loophole for avoiding the examiner system,
but was intended merely to exempt from the provisions of the act
"special types of statutory hearing officers who contribute some spe-
cial qualifications." He listed registers of the General Land Office as
special types of statutory hearing officers.
7 6
73. Fuchs, The Hearing Examiner Fiasco under the Administrative Procedure
Act, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 737 (1950); Thomas, The Selection of Federal Hearing
Examiners: Pressure Groups and the Administrative Process, 59 Yale L.J. 431
(1950).
74. [Hoover] Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the
Government, Task Force Report on Legal Services and Procedures 140, 168-69
(1955). The recommendation is made that § 5 be amended to cover agency pro-
ceedings required to be determined after opportunity for an agency hearing under
the Constitution or by statute.
75. 339 U.S. 33 (1950). The case dealt with the application of the APA to
deportation proceedings. The case was extended to property interests in Riss &
Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 907 (1951). See also Cates v. Haderlein, 342 U.S.
804 (1951), reversing per curiam 189 F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1951); Door v. Donald-
son, 195 F.2d 764 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
The Court also held that the immigration inspectors were not hearing officers
"specifically provided for by or designated pursuant to statute" under § 7(a).
In defining the exception in § 7 (a), the Court stated in 339 U.S. at 52 "they must
be examiners whose independence and tenure are so guarded by the Act as to
give the assurances of neutrality which Congress thought would guarantee the
impartiality of the administrative process." This interpretation is criticized in
Davis, Administrative Law 308 (1951), where it is suggested that the case should
have been decided on the ground that the hearing violated § 5 (c). For subsequent
history as to deportation proceedings, see Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 306-7
(1955).
76. S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 227-28 (1946). Compare the quota-
tion from the Wong Yang Sung case, note 75 supra.
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After the APA, the Department took the position that formal hear-
ings were not required in mineral contests because, unlike the situa-
tion with reference to grazing applications, no federal statute required
such a hearing. Section 5 of the APA by its terms applied only to
hearings required to be held by statute. There was no departmental
decision on the precise point, however. The distinction between graz-
ing applications and mining claims on the right to a hearing was
anomalous. A mining claim has traditionally been regarded as a
property interest, whereas grazing permits are at best unsubstantial
interests.
In 1956 the Department abruptly reversed its traditional position
in Keith V. O'Leary.7 7 There the government contested an applica-
tion to patent a placer claim, contending that minerals had not been
found in sufficient quantities to constitute a valid discovery. A hear-
ing was held before the land office manager who sustained the gov-
ernment's charges. On appeal, the Secretary of the Interior held
that the APA applied to contest cases involving the validity of mining
claims. The decision was based upon the theory that under the Wong
Yang Sung case,78 the APA applies whenever the due process clause
requires a hearing. An unpatented mining claim is property in the
fullest sense,79 and a hearing is required in any adjudication of its
validity. Moreover, the manager of the land office is not an officer
authorized by section 7 to preside at hearings. 0
The O'Leary decision resulted in radical revision of contest proce-
dures in mining cases.8' The regulations now state that if an answer
is not filed by the contestee, the allegations of the complaint filed by
the contestant will be regarded as admitted and the manager will
decide the case without a hearing.82 If an answer is filed, the case
77. 63 I.D. 341 (1956). In a subsequent appeal to the director in the same
case, it was held that an appeal from an interlocutory ruling was premature.
United States v. O'Leary, Contest No. 5168, August 15, 1957 (unpublished).
78. Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950).
79. Manuel v. Wulff, 152 U.S. 505, 510-11 (1894): ". . . mining claims are
property, in the fullest sense of the word, and may be sold, transferred, mort-
gaged, and inherited without infringing the title of the United States, and ...
when a location is perfected it has the effect of a grant by the United States of
the right of present and exclusive possession." See also Cole v. Ralph, 252 U.S.
286, 295 (1920).
80. It is correct that the manager is not an independent hearing examiner
of the type envisaged by § 5(c) of the APA. The opinion overlooks, however,
that the manager was regarded as a special statutory hearing officer and thus
within the exception in § 7(c) at the time the APA was passed. See note 76
supra.
81. The departmental rules of practice had been revised on May 1, 1956. Major
changes were again made after the O'Leary decision. See Sec. Int. Ann. Rep.
304 (1957).
82. 43 C.F.R. § 221.65 (Supp. 1957).
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will be referred to an examiner upon determining that the elements
of a contest appear to exist. The details of the procedure before the
examiner were also revised along quasi-judicial lines.3
The principal change in the regulations after O'Leary consists of
the utilization of semi-independent hearing examiners, qualified and
appointed under the Civil Service Commission's regulations. By the
end of the 1957 fiscal year, eight hearing examiners had been ap-
pointed. Although they are employed by the Bureau, the agency has,
of course, no removal power. This group of examiners hears appeals
in grazing applications as well as in contests involving mineral claims.
In the Secretary's annual report for 1957, the Bureau reported that
there were 240 unclosed cases before the hearing examiners at the
end of June, 1957, 12 more than at the beginning of the year. While
this is due in part to the fact that the examiners were not appointed
until late in the year, the backlog is still great.8 4 The 1958 annual
report will reveal how efficiently the examiner system is working and
whether additional examiners are needed.
There have been some recent limitations on the right to a hearing
on the record in mineral applications. The land office manager has
some discretion in determining whether a contest exists. Thus, if
the contestant's allegations indicate that as a matter of law his claim
is void, there is no necessity for a hearing.85 This is acceptable when
viewed in the light of the circumstances of the particular case. In
another decision, it was held that the right to a hearing before an
examiner (instead of the manager) may not be raised for the first
time on appeal to the Secretary.8
It should also be noted that hearings are not held in connection
with applications for oil and gas leases on federal land under the
Leasing Act of 1920. Awarding the lease is discretionary with the
Secretary and since the Leasing Act does not require a hearing, the
APA has no application.-
83. 43 C.F.R. §§ 221.69-.77 (Supp. 1957).
84. Sec. Int. Ann. Rep. 305 (1957).
85. Clear Gravel Enterprises, Inc., 64 I.D. 210 (1957).
86. United States v. Adams, 64 I.D. 221 (1957). The failure to observe the
requirements of the APA does not necessarily invalidate the proceeding. Timely
objection must be made. In this case, the objection was first raised more than
three years after the hearing, more than two years after the manager's decision
and almost a year after the acting director's decision. Moreover, the appellant
was unable to show that the proceeding before the manager was in any way
inherently unfair.
87. See Northern Pac. Ry., 62 I.D. 401, 410 (1955). In Halvor F. Holbeck,
62 I.D. 411, 414 (1955), it is pointed out ". . . it is well to remember that the
issuance of oil and gas leases, even when the public land is available for such
leasing, is committed to the discretion of the Secretary and that he may refuse
to issue a lease when to do so would not be in the public interest." See also
Earl J. Boehme, 62 I.D. 9 (1955). Similarly, in A. Ben Shallit, 63 I.D. 193 (1956),
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The revised regulations now contain detailed rules relating to
appeal from the examiner to the director and the Secretary.18 The
director may on his own motion or at the request of either party order
a hearing for the reception of evidence on issues of fact before a field
commissioner. Granting a hearing is within the discretion of the
director, however, and the Department has taken the stand that any
such hearing need not conform to the requirements of the APA.8 1 As
a practical matter such hearings are conducted in much the same
manner as those before the examiners.90 On appeal to the Secretary
no hearing is held, but he has discretion to grant oral argument."
Judicial review of the Secretary's decision is beyond the scope of this
article. It should be noted, however, that the courts are most reluc-
tant to interfere with public land matters committed by Congress to
the discretion of the Secretary.92
CONCLUSION
The Department has also considered the effect of two miscellaneous
provisions of the APA. These are section 4 dealing with the rule
making function 93 and section 3 (a) relating to publication of policy
decisions.94 The important advance in Bureau procedure, however,
has been the utilization of semi-independent hearing examiners in
mining contests as well as in grazing applications. This long overdue
reform appears in the main to be working satisfactorily. The ten-
dency of the regulations has been to judicialize procedure to the point
where Bureau practice has become a specialty of a segment of the
bar in the West. The regulations abound with words like "complaint,"
"motion to dismiss," "demurrer" etc. The current notions of burden
of proof in grazing cases is fully as complicated as any line of judicial
decisions on the subject. In this trend toward conformity with judi-
cial procedure, it might be well to bear in mind Professor Davis'
wise admonition :15
The successes of informal adjudication are so impressive that
excessive formalism in some agencies seems especially unfortu-
nate. Many tasks call for round tables and unbuttoned vests, not
for witness chairs and courtroom trappings.
no hearing was granted under APA for issuance of a right of way over land
included in coal lease, because no statute required such hearing.
88. 43 C.F.R. §§ 221.1-.37 (Supp. 1957).
89. Report, Minerals Technical Conference, Oct. 11, 1956 (unpublished). This
is a summary of a conference with Department personnel to discuss changes in
Bureau procedure resulting from the O'Leary decision.
90. See 43 C.F.R. §§ 221.11-.20 (Supp. 1957).
91. Id. § 221.36.
92. Wilbur v. United States ex rel. Krushnic, 280 U.S. 306 (1930).
93. Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 59 I.D. 431 (1947); Wade McNeil, 64 I.D. 423
(1957).
94. Max Barash, 63 I.D. 51 (1956).
95. Davis, Administrative Law 183 (1951).
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